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This study investigated the nature of institutional shareholder activism in South Africa with a particular focus on proxy 
voting as a public form of shareholder discontent. A total of 24 510 votes cast by 17 local investment management 
companies in 2013 were analysed. Interviews were also conducted with selected investment managers to gain more insight 
into the proxy voting process at their companies. Based on this data, it was concluded that investment managers preferred 
to engage with investee companies in private and viewed proxy voting as the last link in the shareholder activism chain. As 
a result, only 6.6 per cent of all votes were ‘against’ resolutions tabled by 347 JSE-listed companies in 2013. Resolutions 
regarding shareholders’ endorsement of companies’ remuneration policies; the election and re-election of directors, 
particularly those serving on audit committees; and the issuance of ordinary shares elicited the most opposition. Companies 
that were excluded from the JSE’s Socially Responsible Investment Index in 2013 attracted significantly more opposition 
than their counterparts who were included in the index when seeking shareholder approval on the election and re-election 
of directors and the placing of shares under the control of directors. The same applied to companies that had low 
environmental, social and governance disclosure scores in 2013 as regards the issuance of shares. It is recommended, 
amongst others, that shareholder activism in South Africa be promoted by enhancing investor education and effecting some 
regulatory changes. 
 
Introduction 
 
“With great power comes great responsibility”  
(Voltaire 1694 – 1778)  
 
South Africa has been through remarkable political changes 
since 1994. Whilst most companies have implemented 
measures to promote social equality and environmental 
sustainability (Matthews, 2014), others are still unresponsive 
to stakeholders’ calls for transformation. Although 
shareholder activism could be instrumental in changing 
corporate policies and practices (Wen, 2009; Thomas & 
Cotter, 2007), shareholder activism is still uncommon in 
South Africa (Viviers, 2014).   
 
As indicated in Figure 1, shareholder activism, also called 
‘active engagement’, is one of three core strategies available 
to investors who wish to align their financial objectives with 
any environmental, social and governance (ESG) concerns 
they may have. Shareholder activists are essentially investors 
who use their equity stake in a company (called the investee 
company) to hold managers accountable on ethical and ESG 
considerations. They can do so by using a combination of 
private and public mechanisms.  
 
Shareholder activism is generally seen as a long-term process 
(European SRI Study 2014; 2014), that is primarily 
undertaken by large institutional investors (Hadani, Goranova 
& Khan, 2011; Poulsen, Strand, & Thomsen, 2010; Sjöstrom, 
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2008). These investors’ dominance as shareholder activists 
can be attributed to the fact that they have more incentives 
and resources to monitor managers’ actions compared to 
those of individual investors (Gillan & Starks, 2007, 2000).  
 
It should be noted that the term ‘institutional investor’ is often 
loosely used to refer to asset owners and asset managers. 
Asset owners, who own ordinary shares in a company, have 
the right to vote on certain matters, such as the election and 
re-election of directors, mergers and acquisitions and 
proposed changes to the company’s capital structure. Matters 
that require shareholder approval are formulated as 
resolutions and are tabled at the company’s AGM. Asset 
owners typically delegate their voting power to asset 
managers (also called investment managers), hence reference 
being made to proxy voting. Shareholders can voice their 
discontent about matters by voting against resolutions or by 
submitting their own resolutions for consideration at the 
AGM. Shareholder resolutions are typically opposed by 
management, hence shareholders’ insistence on a vote. 
 
The first academic study on institutional shareholder activism 
in South Africa was conducted by Veicht (1995). Since then 
only limited research has been undertaken on the mechanisms 
used by local shareholder activists to. Given that researchers 
do not have access to data on private engagements between 
shareholders and investee companies, the primary objective 
of this study was thus to investigate proxy voting as a public 
shareholder activism mechanism. Aggarwal, Saffi and 
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Sturgess (2015) provide further justification for a study on 
proxy voting by arguing that it is one of the key mechanisms 
currently used by institutional investors to exert their 
influence on corporate decision-making. Secondary 
objectives were to gain some understanding of the causative 
factors behind voting behaviour and to provide practical 
recommendations to stimulate the broader adoption of 
shareholder activism in South Africa. Recommendations 
relevant to pension fund trustees, investment management 
companies, consultants, academics, and the South African 
regulator are put forward. 
 
 
Figure 1: Responsible investment strategies  
 
Source: Adapted from Nordén & Strand (2011); Morgan, 
Poulsen, Wolf & Yang (2011); Cheng, Huang, Li & Lobo 
(2010); Judge, Guar & Muller-Kahle (2010); Admati & 
Pfleiderer (2009); Kaempfer, Lehman & Lowenberg (2009) 
 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: next, an 
in-depth discussion of the concept of institutional shareholder 
activism is provided, followed by an exposition of the 
methods used to collect and analyse data. Finally, the main 
findings are summarised and some recommendations put 
forward. 
 
Shareholder activism  
 
The global context 
 
Religious groups in the United States (US) were the first 
shareholders to raise their human rights concerns in public in 
the 1940s (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). Public pension funds 
followed suit in the 1980s and were later joined by private 
pension funds and trade unions. A review of US studies 
suggests that, while many shareholder activists make 
extensive use of shareholder resolutions, the majority prefer 
to resolve issues in private. Willard, Carleton, Nelson and 
Weisbach (2002), for example, found that a large US 
financial institution reached agreements with targeted 
companies more than 95 per cent of the time. In the vast 
majority of these cases, the agreements were reached without 
shareholders voting on the resolution. Likewise, Bauer, 
Moers and Viehs (2012) attributed the withdrawal of 
shareholder resolutions in the US to successful private 
negotiations. They defined these successful negotiations as 
ones where both parties reached an amicable arrangement on 
how management should implement the shareholders’ 
resolutions.          
 
Legislation in the United Kingdom (UK) allows shareholders 
to use legal proceedings and shareholder resolutions to 
enforce their rights. However, as these measures are seen as 
“very public” or “very aggressive”, they are rarely used by 
shareholder activists (Becht, Franks, Mayer & Rossi, 2010). 
The general belief in the UK is that confidential and frank 
negotiations with investee companies result in the building of 
trust between shareholders and managers, thus resolving the 
issues.  
 
The South African context  
 
Despite claims that shareholder activism can be a lightning 
rod to “accelerate socio-economic transformation in South 
Africa” (Greenblo, 2014a), and Veitch’s (1995: 52) 
conclusion that institutional investors “have tremendous 
clout”, little is known about the role that institutional 
investors can play in promoting corporate change before it 
was highlighted in the second King report (King II) on 
corporate governance in South Africa, published in 2002. 
Legal experts, however, cautioned that any attempt to 
promote shareholder activism (as suggested in King II) 
should address the underlying reasons of shareholder apathy 
in the country (Rademeyer & Holtzhausen, 2004). These 
reasons included a lack of access to company information, a 
lack of expertise to process company information, and failure 
to recognise the importance of shareholder activism and its 
associated costs. Similar barriers to shareholder activism 
have been noted in the international literature (Morgan et al., 
2011; Sjöstrom, 2008). Despite shareholder engagement 
receiving more attention post-King II, only one investment 
manager employed an engagement overlay at the turn of the 
millennium (Viviers, 2014).  
 
Although South African asset owners are legally permitted to 
file shareholder resolutions, very few do so (Silverman & 
Duncan, 2014; Lekhesa, 2009). In an attempt to promote 
institutional shareholder activism in South Africa, the 
Association of Savings and Investments SA launched a Code 
for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA) in 2011. 
This Code was developed in conjunction with the Institute of 
Directors Southern Africa and the Principal Officers 
Association. The Code incorporates the United Nations’ 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) and the 
recommendations of the third King report (King III) on 
Strategy Purpose of strategy Mechanism 
Screening  
Negative 
screening 
Refraining from investing in 
the securities of companies 
producing ‘undesirable’ 
products or services, as well as 
those operating in ‘undesirable’ 
industries and countries. 
Applying exclusionary investment 
criteria.  
Positive 
screening  
Investing in companies that are 
deemed good corporate citizen; 
i.e. those companies that are 
proactive on managing ethical, 
environmental, social and 
corporate governance risks.  
Applying positive investment 
criteria.  
Best-in-class 
screening  
Investing in companies that are 
deemed good corporate citizens 
in selected industries.  
Applying exclusionary and positive 
investment criteria. 
Impact / community / 
empowerment / cause-related 
investing  
Supporting particular causes by 
investing directly in them. 
Providing equity and debt capital to 
social enterprises and micro lenders.  
Shareholder 
activism 
Private 
activism 
Raising concerns with 
companies in private. 
Writing letters, engaging in 
confidential negotiations, initiating 
legal proceeding and divesting, i.e. 
selling all the shares owned in a 
company that fails to respond to a 
shareholder’s requests.  
Public 
activism 
Raising concerns with 
companies in public. 
Filing shareholder resolutions, 
asking questions at annual general 
meetings, voting ‘against’ 
management resolutions and 
stimulating public debate on issues 
of concern. 
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corporate governance in South Africa (Code for Responsible 
Investing in South Africa, 2011).  
 
Despite public support for the Code, a survey by the CRISA 
committee in 2013 revealed that few institutional investors 
seriously considered the principles (Responsible investment 
research – CRISA disclosure by institutional investors and 
their service providers, 2013). The committee’s findings 
concur with Winfield’s (2011: 2) claim that “only a handful 
of local investment managers are excited, passionate and 
serious about proxy voting and other means of stewardship”.  
 
The effectiveness of proxy voting as a shareholder 
activism mechanism 
 
Several researchers have investigated the effectiveness of 
institutional shareholder activism in changing corporate 
behaviour (Chung & Talaulicar, 2009; Wen, 2009).  As 
researchers do not have access to data on private discussions 
between shareholders and investee companies, most studies 
on the effectiveness of shareholder activism focus on proxy 
voting and non-binding shareholder resolutions.  
 
Karpoff, Malatesta and Walking (1996) and Gillan and Starks 
(2000) both reported that non-binding shareholder resolutions 
on executive compensation, the so-called ‘say-on-pay’ votes, 
appear to have no consistent effects on shareholder value. The 
authors contended that, although advisory say-on-pay votes 
do not affect corporate pay levels, they do cast a spotlight on 
companies with poor corporate governance. More recently, 
Conyon and Sadler (2010) and Armstrong, Gow and Larcker 
(2013) found that neither low voting support for, nor outright 
rejection of these executive remuneration plans had led to a 
decrease in the level  and composition of CEO incentive 
compensation. In contrast, Ferri and Maber (2013) noted that 
UK firms responded to negative say-on-pay votes by 
removing controversial CEO pay practices. Increased support 
for shareholder resolutions in recent years has furthermore 
resulted in boards becoming more willing to remove anti-
takeover defences (Thomas & Cotter, 2007), and to reform 
pollution management practices (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011).  
 
Characteristics of companies targeted by 
shareholder activists 
 
The literature suggests that a number of factors contribute to 
the likelihood of a company being targeted by shareholder 
activists, be it in private or public. Clark and Hebb (2004) 
highlighted a home bias in private negotiations, showing that 
UK firms were more likely to be targeted by UK shareholder 
activists than were foreign firms. In contrast, Poulsen et al. 
(2010) noted that the prevalence of shareholder activism was 
higher in Swedish companies with more foreign ownership.  
 
Rehbein, Waddock and Graves (2006) reported that 
shareholder activists in the US targeted companies producing 
controversial products (such as tobacco) and those with poor 
environmental practices. Studies by Morgan et al. (2011) and 
Wu (2004) also revealed that companies in specific industries 
were targeted due to poor employee and community relations 
and weak corporate governance policies and practices. Sparks 
and Cowton (2004) noted that shareholder resolutions on 
corporate social responsibility received around 25 per cent of 
votes cast in the 1990s. The authors argued that such a high 
level of public support placed significant pressure on 
companies to respond positively to shareholders’ concerns.  
 
As companies are under continued pressure to improve their 
environmental, social and governance disclosure and 
performance (Ho, 2013; Kolk, 2008), inclusion in a 
responsible investment index is becoming more prevalent 
(Curto & Vital, 2014). Examples of prominent responsible 
investment indices in the global context include the Domini 
400 Social Index, the FTSE4 Good Indices series and the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes series. The JSE’s Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI) index was the first of its kind 
to be introduced in an emerging market. It is currently setting 
the standard for JSE-listed companies in terms of non-
financial reporting (Maubane, Prinsloo & Van Rooyen, 
2014).  
 
Several authors determined that large companies are mostly 
targeted (via the proxy voting process) due to their visibility 
(Nordén & Strand, 2011; Poulsen et al., 2010) as are those 
that reported poor financial results in previous periods (Lantz, 
Montandrau & Sahut, 2010; Ng, Wang & Zaiats, 2009; 
Karpoff et al., 1996).  
 
In the light of the typical factors that attract shareholder 
activism in the literature, the hypotheses as shown in Table 1 
were formulated for empirical testing in the South African 
context.  
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Table 1: Research hypotheses  
 
 Expected relationship Relevant variables  
H1: Companies excluded from the JSE SRI index attract significantly more 
‘against’ votes compared to those included in the index 
Inclusion in the JSE SRI index in 2013 
H2: Companies with low ESG disclosure scores attract significantly more 
‘against’ votes than those with high ESG disclosure scores  
ESG disclosure score in 2013 
H3: Companies with low corporate governance disclosure scores attract 
significantly more ‘against’ votes than those with high corporate 
governance disclosure scores 
Corporate governance disclosure score in 2013 
H4: Larger companies attract significantly more ‘against’ votes than smaller 
companies 
Company size in 2013 as control variable measured 
by total assets and the three ratios: market – to –book 
value, capital expenditure- to- total assets and long –
term debt –to-total assets 
H5: Companies with poor prior accounting performance attract significantly 
more ‘against’ votes than those with strong prior accounting performance 
Four year average return on assets (ROA) 
H6: Companies with poor prior market performance attract significantly more 
‘against’ votes than those with strong prior market performance 
Four year average total return  
H7: Industries differ in their tendency to attract ‘against’ votes. Industry classification  
Research design  
 
To address the research objectives of this study, both 
secondary and primary data were collected and analysed.  
 
Secondary data collection and analysis 
 
Proxy voting data for 2013 were collected from the websites 
of 17 investment management companies in the country. 
Investment management companies were selected in a 
purposeful way based on their size (and hence potential 
influence as shareholder activists) and the availability of 
proxy voting data. A total of 97 asset management companies 
operated in South Africa in 2013, managing approximately 
R5.6 trillion worth of assets (De Bruin, 2014). The 17 
investment management companies selected for this study 
collectively managed approximately R5156.65 billion, 
representing 92 per cent of assets under management. Where 
data were not publicly available, it was requested directly 
from investment management companies. The majority of 
investment management companies in the sample (76.4%) 
were PRI signatories on 31 December 2013.  
 
The selected investment management companies voted on 
24 510 resolutions in 2013. For each resolution, the following 
data were captured in an Excel database: 
 
 Name of the investment manager who voted on the 
resolution, e.g. Allan Gray.  
 The share code of the JSE-listed company that tabled the 
resolution, e.g. SOL.    
 Type of resolution, i.e. ordinary or special.  
 Type of meeting where the resolution was tabled. Codes 
were assigned for the following types of meetings: 
annual general meeting, general meeting, extraordinary 
general meeting, scheme meeting and special meeting.  
 Manager’s vote. Codes were used to distinguish among 
three possible votes, namely for, against and abstain.  
 Voting outcome. Codes were assigned to resolutions 
based on the outcome of the voting process, namely  
passed, rejected or withdrawn. Some of this data had to 
be sourced from RMB Custody and Trustee Services.  
 
All resolutions that attracted ‘against’ votes were categorised 
into themes. Resolutions tend to be fairly uniform in purpose 
as listed companies need to adhere to the guidelines set out in 
the Companies Act (No. 71 of 2008), the JSE listings 
requirements and King III. Forty-two financial and corporate-
governance categories emerged from this classification.  
Resolutions pertaining to preference shares, exchange traded 
funds, N-shares and B-shares were excluded from the study. 
For comparative purposes, only those resolutions tabled at 
AGMs in 2013 were analysed. A total of 347 JSE-listed 
shares were covered in the final analysis.  
 
In line with  Ng et al. (2009), the dependent variable was 
constructed by merging the forty-two original catgories of 
responses into six  homogeneous classes and by tallying  the 
percentage of voting asset managers who voted against the 
resolutions in each of the following categories: the election 
and re-election of directors; remuneration policy; fees and 
incentives; placing ordinary shares, preference shares or 
linked units under directors’ control; issuing ordinary shares, 
preference shares or linked units; and repurchasing shares. 
The independent variables represent three categories of 
variables, namely index inclusion variables (JSE SRI Index, 
ESG disclosure score and the corporate governance 
disclosure score), historical performance related variables 
(return on assets and total industry adjusted returns), and size-
related control variables (the market-to-book ratio, the capital 
expenditure-to-total assets ratio, the long-term debt-to-total 
assets ratio and the total assets). The selected four size-related 
control variables are typically used by researchers when 
evaluating proxy voting activity (e.g. Matvos & Ostrovsky, 
2010; Ng et al., 2009).  
 
Details on the operationalisation of the independent variables 
are presented in Table 2. For the purpose of regression 
modelling all incomplete cases were deleted and outliers 
beyond two standard deviations in the residuals were deleted. 
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Table 2: Operationalisation of the independent (including the control) variables 
 
Independent variables Measurement Data source(s) 
Inclusion in the JSE SRI index in 
2013 
A code of 1 was assigned to companies that were included in the index and a 
zero to those that were excluded.  
The JSE 
ESG disclosure score in 2013 This score ranged from zero to 100. A score of zero indicated that the company 
reported on some of the ESG criteria evaluated, but did not meet the 
acceptability criteria. The higher the score, the more comprehensively the 
company disclosed its ESG policies and practices. An ‘N/A’ indicated that the 
company did not disclose any of the evaluated information in its 2013 annual 
report. 
Bloomberg 
Corporate governance  disclosure 
score in 2013 
The same interpretation as above. Bloomberg 
Industry classification Resources; Basic materials; General industrials; Consumer goods; Consumer 
services; Financials; Technology; AltX  
The JSE 
Four year average return on assets 
(ROA) 
Arithmetic mean of ROAs at financial year-end (2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013). Bloomberg  
Four year average total return Arithmetic mean of the difference between a company’s total return and its 
industry’s return on 31 December of each year (2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013). 
Bloomberg and the 
JSE 
Market-to-book ratio in 2013 Market capitalisation divided by book value of equity on 31 December 2013. Bloomberg 
CAPEX-to-total assets ratio in 
2013 
Capital expenditure divided by total assets on 31 December 2013. Bloomberg 
Long-term debt-to-total assets 
ratio in 2013  
Long-term debt divided by total assets on 31 December 2013. Bloomberg 
Company size in 2013  Log of total assets on 31 December 2013. Bloomberg  
 
Descriptive statistics were computed and the stated 
hypotheses were tested by means of stepwise multiple 
regression analysis using cross-sectional data.   
 
Primary data collection and analysis  
 
A number of informal telephonic and personal interviews 
were conducted with seven investment managers to gauge 
their views on the statistical findings of the study. These 
individuals were selected based on the extent to which their 
companies opposed management. This subjective selection 
criterion was based on the percentage of against votes they 
cast in 2013, public criticism levelled against JSE-listed 
companies in the media and the investment manager’s 
reputation as shareholder activist.  
 
Open-ended questions were posed to gain more insight into 
managers’ views on proxy voting as a shareholder activism 
tool, the availability of their proxy voting policies and results 
and the proxy voting process followed in their respective 
companies. Some questions also centred on the effectiveness 
of proxy voting as a means to voice shareholder dissent, the 
need for shareholder activism in South Africa and 
suggestions to stimulate active engagement among 
institutional investors in the country. The qualitative data 
gathered during the interviews were coded and examined for 
recurrent patterns as well as inconsistencies.  
 
Empirical findings  
 
Views on proxy voting as a shareholder activism tool 
 
Although all the investment managers who were interviewed 
deemed shareholder activism as an important responsible 
investment strategy, they had vastly different views on what 
the phenomenon exactly entailed. Several investment 
managers believed that shareholder activism consisted of 
proxy voting only, whereas others contended that proxy 
voting was only “the tip of the activism iceberg”. The latter 
view is more in line with current thinking in that proxy voting 
is only one of the mechanisms that shareholders can use to 
voice their concerns. Although all 17 investment 
management companies had proxy voting policies at the end 
of 2013, just over half of these policies (53%) were available 
online. Very few of these investment management companies 
(41%) published their proxy voting results online, despite the 
fact that PRI signatories are required to make their proxy 
voting results available to the public. Those that did not 
publish their results online indicated that the results were 
available on request.  
 
The proxy voting process 
 
The interviews further revealed that proxy voting processes 
differed between the investment management companies. 
Whereas some of the managers delegated the responsibility 
of voting to analysts, others had dedicated teams allocated to 
this activity. The physical act of voting also ranged from 
capturing votes online, to electronically submitting votes to 
custodians and casting paper-based votes that were either 
scanned or faxed to custodians. Custodians confirmed that 
quite a large portion of votes was still paper-based. This 
process seems to be very inefficient and slow and poses the 
question whether these votes are monitored at all.  
 
Proxy voting results 
 
A summary of the 17 investment management companies’ 
proxy voting results in 2013 is tabulated in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Proxy voting results 
 
Investment management company 
No of JSE-listed companies 
whose shares were voted on 
Managers’ votes ‘Against’ votes 
as % of total Abstain Against For Total 
Abax Investments 8 0 12 139 151 7.9 
Afena Capital 40 4 69 855 928 7.4 
Allan Gray 77 37 90 1 179 1 306 6.9 
Cadiz Asset Management 25 0 48 470 518 9.3 
Coronation Fund Managers 339 4 125 5278 5 407 2.3 
Element Investment Managers  46 22 161 631 814 19.8 
Foord Asset Management 6 0 21 54 75 28.0 
Futuregrowth Asset Management 5 1 1 62 64 1.6 
Investec Asset Management 57 22 42 993 1 057 4.0 
Kagiso Asset Management 37 15 82 606 703 11.7 
Old Mutual Investment Group (SA) 146 427 135 2 144 2 706 5.0 
Public Investment Corporation 91 4 150 2 206 2 360 6.4 
Prescient Investment Management 78 0 104 1495 1 599 6.5 
Prudential Portfolio Managers 50 0 67 572 639 10.5 
Stanlib 123 2 17 2 252 2 271 0.7 
Taquanta Asset Managers 133 2 192 2 243 2 437 7.9 
Vunani Fund Management 116 21 294 1 160 1 475 19.9 
Total  561 1 610 22 339 24 510   
Total as % of all votes  2.3 6.6 91.1 100.0   
 
An inspection of Table 3 shows that only 6.6 per cent of votes 
were against the resolutions tabled by JSE-listed companies. 
The investment managers interviewed attributed the low 
percentage of ‘against’ votes to successful private 
negotiations that took place with investee companies before 
their AGMs. As most of the investment managers’ concerns 
had been adequately resolved before tabling, they voted in 
favour of the majority of proposals. Several of the investment 
managers emphasised that the low percentage of ‘against’ 
votes should not be interpreted as inactivity on their part, but 
that it was rather the result of proxy voting being “the last link 
in the engagement chain”.  
 
 
Table 4: Corporate governance-oriented resolutions attracting ‘against’ votes  
 
Resolution n % of all ‘against’ votes (N = 1 610)  
Approving the company’s remuneration policy 231 14.3 
Re-electing a director 188 11.7 
Placing authorised, but unissued ordinary shares under directors’ control 184 11.4 
Electing / re-electing audit committee member(s)(b) 107 6.6 
Approving non-executive directors’ remuneration / fees(a) 97 6.0 
Approving / amending the share incentive plan(c) 27 1.7 
Adopting a new memorandum of incorporation 26 1.6 
Other(d) 21 1.3 
Placing authorised, but unissued linked units under directors’ control 16 1.0 
Amending the existing memorandum of incorporation 15 0.9 
Changing the notice period for general meetings 11 0.7 
Appointing / re-appointing independent external auditors 10 0.6 
Placing authorised, but unissued preference shares under directors’ control 9 0.6 
Approving the chairperson’s remuneration / fees(e) 8 0.5 
Approving a share option plan for employees and managers  7 0.4 
Increasing the authorised ordinary share capital of the company 5 0.3 
Implementing resolutions passed at the annual general meeting 5 0.3 
Approving / adopting / amending the long-term incentive plan 4 0.2 
Making donations to political organisations and incurring political expenditure 3 0.2 
Approving amendments to the unit purchase trust scheme 3 0.2 
Electing a chairperson(e) 2 0.1 
Receiving, considering and adopting the company’s annual financial statements 2 0.1 
(a) In some cases, reference was only made to the remuneration of directors in general and not non-executive directors specifically.   
(b) In some cases, reference was made to the Audit Committee, whereas others referred to the Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee or the Audit and 
Risk Committee or the Audit and Compliance Committee.  
(c) In some cases, the share incentive plan was called a share option plan or a share plan. It was not always specified whether the plan was a long-term 
incentive plan.  
(d) ‘Other’ resolutions included matters such as considering the social and ethics report and approving a scheme of arrangement. 
(e) Not all resolutions specified whether the chairperson was an executive or non-executive chairperson. As a result, no distinction was made to categorise 
these resolutions.  
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The nature of ‘against’ votes 
 
Given the well-developed corporate governance framework 
that exists in South Africa (Boshoff & Schulshenk, 2014: 3), 
it came as no surprise that most of the ‘against’ votes focused 
on governance considerations (see Table 4). No resolutions 
about environmental or social considerations provoked 
‘against’ votes in this sample. 
 
The corporate governance resolution that attracted the most 
opposition was that of approving the remuneration policies of 
investee companies. At present, this vote remains a non-
binding, advisory vote. The status quo implies that 
remuneration committees do not have to change their 
remuneration policies even if more than 50 per cent of 
shareholders are opposed to it. This finding may be reflective 
of what Van Niekerk (2014) called a “mounting fury against 
the perceived exuberance of executive pay” in South Africa.  
 
Although the endorsement of a company’s remuneration 
policy is non-binding, research by Ernst & Young in 2013 
revealed that a large number of ‘against’ votes is a clear sign 
of shareholder discontent (Remuneration governance in 
South Africa - 2013 survey results, 2013). A third of the 
remuneration committees that participated in the Ernst & 
Young study viewed an ‘against’ vote of 30 per cent or more 
as a warning signal, but only a fifth of these committees 
changed their remuneration policies in response to the 2013 
non-binding vote. A growing interest in remuneration-related 
voting is also noted internationally (Armstrong, et al., 2013; 
Ferri & Maber, 2013; Conyon & Sadler, 2010).  
 
Other corporate governance-oriented resolutions that 
attracted some opposition in 2013 involved the election and 
re-election of directors, particularly those serving on audit 
committees. Reasons for opposing these appointments 
included the lack of the independence of directors, and so-
called ‘over-boardedness’ - a term describing directors who 
serve on several boards concurrently. Research in the US 
shows that shareholder activists have been quite effective in 
blocking the appointment of certain directors by ‘just vote no’ 
campaigns (Del Guercio, Seery & Woidtke, 2008).  
 
Table 5 illustrates that the majority of the financially-oriented 
resolutions that attracted opposition in 2013 centred on 
changes to the capital structures of investee companies, 
particularly in cases where managers sought approval to issue 
shares for incentive schemes. Shareholders in the US have 
voted against such proposals long before the current debate 
on appropriate executive remuneration (see for example 
Morgan & Poulsen, 2001; Wagner & Wagner, 1997).  
 
 
Table 5: Financially-oriented resolutions attracting ‘against’ votes 
 
Resolution n % of all ‘against’ votes (N = 1 610) 
Issuing ordinary shares for cash(a) 156 9.7 
Issuing ordinary shares  119 7.4 
Repurchasing ordinary shares(b) 98 6.1 
Providing financial assistance(c) 89 5.5 
Not exerting pre-emption rights 29 1.8 
Approving the issuing of shares to directors and/or prescribed officers under 
the share incentive plan 17 1.1 
Issuing linked units for cash 16 1.0 
Issuing linked units 12 0.7 
Issuing ordinary shares for the purpose of share options 10 0.6 
Issuing preference shares 9 0.6 
Creating and issuing convertible debentures 7 0.4 
Repurchasing linked units 4 0.2 
(a) Four resolutions related to issuing shares, and to sell treasury shares, for cash were included in this category.  
(b) No distinction was made between resolutions based on the percentage of shares to be repurchased. 
(c) This category included resolutions involving financial assistance for directors, prescribed officers, employee share scheme beneficiaries and related or 
interrelated companies.  
 
The two largest industries in South Africa, namely the 
financial and resources industries, attracted the most ‘against’ 
votes in 2013 (31.1% and 19.1% respectively).  
 
The impact of ‘against’ votes  
 
A very small percentage of ‘against’ votes resulted in the 
rejection (2.7%) or the withdrawal (2.7%) of resolutions. This 
finding should, however, be interpreted with caution. 
Investment managers indicated that resolutions were often 
withdrawn as a result of successful private negotiations, or, 
when it became apparent to management that the resolution 
would not be supported at the AGM.  
 
Characteristics of companies that attracted ‘against’ 
votes in 2013 
 
As indicated earlier, six resolution categories were created to 
establish whether shareholder activists targeted companies 
with certain characteristics. The dependent variable for each 
resolution category was the percentage of voting asset 
managers who voted against a particular resolution. An initial 
analysis, which comprised a single-factor analysis of 
30 S.Afr.J.Bus.Manage.2015,46(4) 
 
 
variance, was undertaken to test whether the mean 
percentages of ‘against’ votes over the different JSE sectors 
were similar.  No evidence was found of a significant JSE 
industry (sectoral) effect in the dependent variable in any of 
the response categories (at the five per cent level of 
significance). As such, no sectoral dummy variables were 
included in the explanatory model.  
 
This analysis was followed by a multiple regression analysis 
utilising all independent and size-related control variables. 
The results yielded low overall explanatory power 
(determination coefficients) accompanied by numerous 
insignificant estimated coefficients, potentially caused by 
multicollinearity. To address this problem, a stepwise 
regression approach was followed using a forward stepping 
algorithm allowing variables into the final equation only if 
significant at the five per cent level. All regression results 
were inspected for normally distributed error terms using 
cumulative probability plots combined with residual outlier 
rejection (beyond two standard deviations) where required. 
Table 6 contains a summary of the statistically significant 
relationships observed.  
 
 
Table 6: Statistically significant relationships  
 
Resolution category 
Significant regression coefficients (p-values are indicated 
in brackets) 
R2 
Sample 
size 
No of 
observations 
deleted Intercept 
 JSE SRI 
index 
ESG 
disclosure 
score 
Capex:TA 
2013 
Electing and re-electing  of 
directors(a) 
23.2937 -6.6723 
(0.0098) 
  0.1309 50 4 
Remuneration policy 21.5804   99.2818 
(0.0116) 
0.1306 48 2 
Issuing ordinary shares, 
preference shares or linked 
units 
41.4545  -0.4656 
(0.0379) 
124.7437 
(0.0451) 
0.1823 35 0 
Placing ordinary shares, 
preference shares or linked 
units under directors' control 
38.3333 -13.4443 
(0.0105) 
  0.1777 36 2 
Fees and incentives(b) No significant variables 
Repurchasing shares No significant variables 
(a) This category consisted of resolutions that dealt with the election and re-election of directors, including the chairperson and directors 
serving on board committees. 
(b) This category contained resolutions that dealt with the approval and/or amending of directors’ fees and various executive incentive 
schemes. 
 
The findings in Table 6 suggest that companies included in 
the JSE SRI index provoked significantly fewer ‘against’ 
votes on proposals to elect directors and to place shares or 
linked units under the control of directors compared to those 
companies that were excluded from this index in 2013. 
Companies with high ESG disclosure scores in 2013 also 
attracted less opposition when seeking approval to issue more 
shares or linked units. The empirical evidence thus provides 
support for Hypotheses H1 and H2 and goes a long way in 
promoting integrated reporting among JSE-listed companies. 
The findings also provide support for the growing demand for 
ESG reporting among responsible investors.  
 
In contrast to the extant literature, no significant relationships 
were observed among any of the other independent variables, 
nor were there any significant differences found between 
industries.  
 
Inspection of Table 6 further reveals that companies with high 
ratios of capital expenditure to total assets attracted more 
‘against’ votes (on remuneration policies and the issuance of 
shares) in 2013 compared to those with low ratios. This 
implies that top managers cannot use (CAPEX) growth as a 
justification for higher salaries and bonuses. In a qualitative 
sense, the results support the results of Ng et al. (2009) in so 
far as the equations suggest low explanatory power coupled 
with a substantive number of insignificant variables. Those 
results that are significant tend to confirm prior expectations 
in terms of the direction of causality. However, the firm-
performance variables, specified as historical averages, could 
not achieve the significance of the time-specific values used 
by Ng et al. (2009) in the context of panel data. No support 
could therefore be found for hypotheses H3 and H5 to H7. 
 
Summary, conclusions and recommendations  
 
As elsewhere in the world, shareholder activism in South 
Africa is a valuable strategy available to responsible investors 
who want to monitor and influence corporate behaviour. By 
virtue of their size, institutional investors have a 
responsibility to encourage ethical and sustainable business 
practices. Although local institutional investors have a range 
of shareholder activism mechanisms at their disposal, most of 
them prefer to engage with investee companies behind closed 
doors. As in the UK, public forms of shareholder activism 
might be seen as too aggressive and counterproductive.  
 
Consistent with the results of Winfield (2011), differences 
were also noted in the current study in terms of the proxy 
voting procedures, policies and philosophies used by local 
S.Afr.J.Bus.Manage.2015,46(4) 31 
 
 
investment management companies. Although all 17 
investment management companies in the current study had 
proxy voting policies at the end of 2013, only half of them 
published their policies online. Even fewer published their 
voting results online. In the spirit of CRISA, local 
institutional investors are encouraged to increase public 
disclosure of their proxy voting policies and results. It is also 
suggested that they publically disclose some details on the 
issues they raised in private with investee companies. 
Enhanced disclosure will not only improve transparency and 
accountability, but it will also go a long way in restoring trust 
in the financial industry.  
 
Investment managers in the sample attributed the low level of 
‘against’ votes in 2013 to successful private negotiations with 
investee companies. Acceptable assurances by investee 
companies to transform their business policies and practices 
could also explain why some resolutions were withdrawn 
prior to being put to a vote. Investment managers’ claims 
challenge the notion that local shareholders are ‘absent 
landlords’ (Greenblo, 2014b; Mathews & Hasenfuss, 2013; 
Barron, 2011; African Governance Report II 2009, 2009). 
More research is, however, required to verify this claim.  
 
The empirical evidence suggests, as in the US and UK, South 
African shareholder activists are also beginning to take a 
more active interest in executive remuneration issues. A 
review of the international literature shows that 
remuneration-related activism has increased substantially 
after the 2008 global financial crisis (Bhagat & Romano, 
2009; Palmon, Santoro & Strauss, 2009). Given that the vote 
to endorse a company’s remuneration policy is non-binding, 
its effect is limited to signalling shareholder dissent. In the 
light of growing concerns about the wage gap in South Africa, 
it is recommended that the regulator investigate alternatives 
to the non-binding vote on remuneration (Crotty, 2014; 
Duncan, 2014). The regulator could change the non-binding 
vote to a binding vote as is the case in the UK, or introduce a 
‘two strikes’ rule as in Australia (Delman, 2010).  
 
Other resolutions, which attracted some opposition in 2013, 
centred on the election and re-election of directors, and 
changes to the capital structures of investee companies. The 
emphasis on corporate governance considerations, relative to 
environmental and social concerns, could be attributed to the 
world-class corporate governance framework that is in place 
in South Africa. It is, however, recommended that 
institutional investors devote more attention to environmental 
and social considerations as well.   
 
In 2013, local shareholder activists targeted companies that 
were excluded from the JSE SRI index and those with poor 
ESG disclosure in a few categories. Companies that wish to 
avoid public shareholder hostility in future would thus do 
well by improving their non-financial reporting and appoint 
adequately qualified and experienced directors.  
 
It is also recommended that more local shareholders, 
irrespective of their size, use the media to raise their concerns 
about unsustainable business practices. Valuable lessons can 
be learned from well-known individual shareholder activist 
Theo Botha’s endeavours in this regard (Steyn, 2011). In the 
UK, prominent investment managers also attribute their 
success as shareholder activists to using the media as an ally, 
and being transparent about their engagements.  
 
Proxy voting procedures in South Africa seem to be 
inefficient as many investment management companies still 
conduct paper-based voting. A changeover to an electronic 
voting system is recommended.  
 
It is expected that more shareholder activism will take place 
as local trustees begin to take an active interest in the 
phenomenon. In this study, it was found that a number of 
investment managers called on boards of trustees to invite 
them to discuss their engagement activities on a regular basis. 
It is foreseen that this kind of interaction will not only 
enhance transparency and accountability in the future, but 
will also lead to better long-term value creation for investors.  
 
Although a few consulting companies (such as ISS Proxy 
Voting Services and Glass Lewis) already provide proxy 
voting advice to local institutional investors, more of these 
specialist services are necessary. It is further recommended 
that the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa consider 
designing a practical framework to enhance relationships 
with investors. The framework of the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors, for example, discusses the legal 
underpinnings governing the relationship between boards, 
shareholders and executives and provides guidance to 
institutional investors on creating effective communication 
strategies. Such a framework would, however, require local 
institutional investors to be exempt from collusion charges 
when collectively engaging with investee companies 
(Greenblo, 2014a). 
 
Tertiary educators and training providers also have a 
responsibility to encourage responsible investment in South 
Africa. Not only should they create more awareness of 
responsible investment strategies among investment 
professionals, but they should also imbue decision-makers 
with the skills necessary for effective engagement. Finally, 
more research is required on the nature of private negotiations 
in South Africa. Particular attention should be given to the 
role of trade unions as shareholder activists.  
 
In 2004, Finlay argued that responsible investment in South 
Africa was “a big boat that we’re trying to row with little 
oars…and we’ve got a long way to go before we reach the 
harbour gates and high seas”.  Since then much has happened 
to shape the nature of responsible investment in the country 
(Viviers, 2014: 769). The findings of this study suggest that 
the tide might finally be turning in favour of greater 
responsible investment in South Africa, especially as far as 
shareholder activism is concerned.  
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